Outside verification
A receipt someone outside your company can check
You can build the approval step yourself. What a log kept inside your company cannot do is convince someone outside it. A Human Seal credential is signed with a published key and checked offline, with one small file, by your customer, your auditor or an authority.
Why this part is worth having
If you already record who approved what, keep doing that. The record in your own books proves something to you. A credential signed with a key you publish proves it to anyone, without trusting your books or ours.
- Checked offline. The verifier is one file. It needs Python and the cryptography package, and it makes no network call.
- Bound to the exact action. Give it the original action and it refuses a credential whose action was changed after approval.
- Your key, an open format. A company can issue these under its own key. The format is open, and the key you publish is the one a counterparty checks.
- A stop signal. A public revocation list says when an approval or an agent has since been stopped. The verifier does not fetch it for you, so check it too.
See a real one
A person at FLOCORE approved one real request on 20 October 2026. The specimen page holds the credential, the published key and the exact action, and your browser checks it with nothing sent anywhere.
What is not true yet
- No outside organisation has completed onboarding, and no authority or auditor has been asked to accept these credentials.
- A credential is a bearer token: key binding is not implemented, so whoever holds one can show it.
- The credential format (SD-JWT VC) is an IETF draft, not a final standard, so it may change.
- The verifier is open to review but has had no independent audit. The browser verifier now checks these credentials too, against a key you paste; it does not fetch the key or check the revocation list.
- A signed approval supports record-keeping and oversight duties. It does not by itself make a system compliant with any law. See the limitations page.